War is unpredictable and with Operation Epic Fury, some of the biggest surprises have occurred off the battlefield. Qatar's posture is one of them. Years of engagement with Iran gave way to a relationship ruptured by missiles and drones -- not exactly the outcome Doha likely expected given its previous outreach to Tehran.
Why else would Qatar's prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, describe Iran's attacks on Qatar as "a big sense of betrayal?" Friends betray; foes do not. Moreover, Qatar's typical, reflexive call for de-escalation was not immediate. Instead, Qatar maintained "its full right to respond" to Iranian aggression and declared Iran's military and security attaches persona non grata. Credit is certainly due for taking a "stand."
But one episode does not a "partner" make. Qatar may be a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) but, contrary to what analysts have suggested, it was never inevitable that Qatar would demonstrate "character under pressure." The record speaks for itself.
Qatar previously came under fire in June 2025, when Iran launched ballistic missiles at Al Udeid air base in response to American attacks on Iran's nuclear sites. And while it's true that Qatar's forces defended against the attack, it is also true that Qatari officials repeatedly offered verbal support to their Iranian counterparts during that 12-day war between Israel and Iran. When the Trump administration launched Operation Midnight Hammer on June 22, Qatar lamented the U.S. "attacks on the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran" before Tehran’s missiles forced the Qataris to tack and defend their territory.
It is also worth mentioning that Qatar had told the United States more than once that it would not allow American forces to launch attacks from Al Udeid air base. Qatar’s warnings did not turn into action, but they are a stark reminder that Doha possesses leverage over the U.S. that it’s not afraid to wield.
Qatar next took a hit on September 9, when the Israeli Air Force targeted a gathering of Hamas leaders in Doha, shattering any illusion of Qatari neutrality. Qatar subsequently appeared to levy pressure on Hamas and clinched a Gaza ceasefire deal after shielding the terrorist group as it stonewalled negotiations for 13 months.
The progress was commendable but short-lived. Within weeks of the deal coming into effect, Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, accused Israel of violating the ceasefire without so much as mentioning Hamas’ provocations. Before year’s end, a spokesperson for the Qatari government suggested that Hamas shouldn’t be expected to fully disarm “under the thumb of occupation.”
This should not have come as a surprise, considering that Qatar has maintained a relationship with Hamas for decades—a relationship that Doha and its defenders regularly dismiss as a necessary precondition for successful mediation. Mutual trust and open lines of communication are certainly necessary in the business of diplomacy. Actively funding and promoting designated terrorist organizations is not.
Qatar and Hamas do not simply enjoy a "working relationship," but a patron-client partnership. Qatar offered sanctuary to Hamas leaders in 1999, after they were expelled from Jordan. In 2003, Qatar attempted to broker an end to the second intifada—a campaign of terrorist attacks that Hamas and other Palestinian terrorists waged in Israel from 2000 to 2005, which claimed the lives of several American citizens. Doha already had "some influence on Hamas' decision-making process," according to media reports, "because a significant portion" of Hamas' funding came "from Qatari sources."
The relationship soared to new heights after Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007. Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani was the first head of state to visit Hamas-ruled Gaza. He pledged $400 million to the strip and his son, the current emir, would oversee the transfer of hundreds of millions more.
The Qataris claim that no "aid has ever been delivered to Hamas' political or military wing," but Israeli troops have recovered documents in Gaza that suggest otherwise. For example, Hamas' late political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly told October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar in 2021 that Sheikh Tamim had "discreetly" provided $11 million for Hamas' leadership but did not "want anyone in the world to know." Meanwhile, Haniyeh was living the Champagne life in Qatar, as were several other members of Hamas' politburo.
Terrorists of various stripes have found similar success in Qatar.
In 1996, the Clinton administration was closing in on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the man that the 9/11 Commission would identify as "the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks." KSM had been living in Qatar on a government salary since the early 1990s, and U.S. officials reportedly feared he "would be tipped off" if they asked Doha to assist. The story ends with Washington deciding to inform Doha and KSM escaping to Pakistan. An American official later told the New York Times that he hadn't seen "any hard evidence" that the Qataris alerted KSM of his impending arrest, but that it seemed "beyond the realm of plausibility that they didn't."
Entire articles can be -- and have been -- written about Qatar's support for extremist actors and anti-Western causes. The lesson that emerges is that Qatar's record of working against American interests is far longer than its record of working in harmony with them. That doesn't mean that Qatar can't or won't change. Qatar's former defense attache to the U.S. said the current war has "forever" changed Doha's relationship with the Islamic Republic. Here's hoping he is right, and that Operation Epic Fury anchors Qatar on America's side.
Natalie Ecanow is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).