The conflict in Iran should be a reminder of, not a cause to divert attention from, U.S. interests in the West Pacific.
America's war in the Middle East demonstrates the necessity of allies to American strategy. This is equally critical in military, economic, and technological contexts. Washington must recognize the essential contribution to its grand strategy that Taiwan provides. Sustaining this partnership requires accelerating military transfers and improving defense-industrial and operational links.
Trump must therefore resist the temptation to diminish this essential partnership just to gain ephemeral goodwill in Beijing during the scheduled May meeting with General Secretary Xi.
The U.S. relationship with Taiwan, by any evaluation, is significantly more equitable than with the European powers. This despite the persistent, bizarre accusation that Taiwan must become a garrison state before it deserves U.S. support.
The reality is that Taiwan remains an essential contributor to American power. Over the last two years, Taiwan has transcended rhetoric to meaningfully improve its capabilities, focusing on the most critical phase of any potential conflict: surviving the first wave of a Chinese attack. By hardening its defenses and investing in asymmetric warfare, Taipei is actively working to blunt a Chinese offensive and provide the U.S. with the valuable time required for a coordinated reaction.
This transformation is evident in Taiwan's shift toward a "porcupine" strategy. Taipei remains nervous about multi-year backlogs in American arms deliveries -- understandably so because of the oscillating character of American defense transfers. However, Taiwan has increasingly pivoted to indigenous, low-cost solutions.
In July 2025, the Ministry of National Defense announced an ambitious plan to procure nearly 50,000 drones by 2027. The specific aim is to develop massive expendable systems that can turn the Taiwan Strait into an "unmanned nightmare" for an invading fleet. Taiwan's advantages in semiconductor manufacturing give a domestic drone ecosystem the potential for deep roots.
Concurrently, Taiwan is investing heavily in mobile Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles, indigenous minelaying ships, and naval drones. These systems are designed to survive initial missile barrages and remain operational even after traditional naval and air assets are neutralized. They are intended to ensure that the cost of a successful amphibious assault remains prohibitively high for Beijing, extending the time Taiwan can survive direct pressure.
Beyond the battlefield, Taiwan is making measurable contributions to American economic and technological security. For the first time in 26 years, Taiwan's trade landscape has fundamentally shifted from the mainland. The U.S. imported more goods last year from Taiwan than from China, while the U.S. for the first time in a quarter-century became Taiwan's largest export partner.
This isn't pure economics -- it is a strategic bet on the American relationship. This bet would be measurably strengthened by clearing the procedural obstacles to the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment, which would cap tariffs on Taiwanese exports to the U.S. as it opened markets in Taiwan for American products. Cooperation on artificial intelligence will be materially enhanced by such dialogues between the U.S. and Taiwan as the Economic Prosperity Partnership which occurred in January this year.
The centerpiece of Taiwan-U.S. economic and security relations is still the massive growth of the semiconductor ecosystem in the U.S. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's investment in Arizona has now expanded to $165 billion, with the company's first fab having entered high-volume production in late 2024.
In short, Taiwan is ensuring that the most advanced chips required for U.S. defense and artificial intelligence are no longer subject to a single point of failure in the Western Pacific. The February 2026 Taiwan-U.S. trade deal reinforced this cooperation, ensuring that Taiwan's technological giants are not only selling to Americans but also actively building the industrial capacity the U.S. lost decades ago.
Recognition of Taiwan's contribution is only the first step. Washington must also move toward multi-year procurement and joint-production agreements for uncrewed systems. Rather than wait for American factories to clear their backlogs, the U.S. should license Taiwanese drone designs for production in the U.S. and vice-versa. This would create a shared "unmanned industrial base" that bypasses the ponderous Foreign Military Sales process and provides both nations with the mass required for a high-intensity conflict.
Second, the U.S. must accelerate the full integration of Taiwan into the American supply chain by finalizing the U.S.-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative's remaining chapters. The current duties and tax hurdles penalize Taiwanese investment in the U.S. Removing these barriers would facilitate the move of secondary and tertiary suppliers -- the advanced packaging and chemical firms -- that are essential for a truly independent semiconductor ecosystem on American soil.
Finally, the U.S. should support a regional Maritime Contingency Fund, whereby Taiwan contributes financially to the hardening of military infrastructure in neighboring nations like the Philippines. This would transform Taiwan from a passive recipient of security into an active financier of collective defense in the First Island Chain. By upgrading runways and fuel depots that U.S. and allied forces would use in a crisis, Taiwan would prove that it is a net contributor to regional stability.
Taiwan is a linchpin in America's Indo-Pacific security and the region's freedom. The war in Iran should not distract attention from this truth. Rather, it should focus renewed attention on it.
Seth Cropsey is the founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy and is the author of "Mayday" and "Seablindness."