WASHINGTON -- The next phase of the Iran war will be defined by uncertainty. At the moment, there is uncertainty over whether the United States, Israel, or Iran will escalate the conflict further. This phase could end abruptly if the conflict does escalate, or it might persist for some time since even a lull in attacks or a deal might not sustainably address the fundamental issues that led to the outbreak of conflict. What is known, however, is that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states sit at the center of this uncertainty. It is those states -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- that Iran would likely target with even more drones, missiles, and potentially further asymmetric attacks if the war intensified. And, more importantly, it will be those states that will share their neighborhood with the Iran that emerges from this conflict.
Prior to the current conflict, many in Washington viewed GCC countries as holding the keys to resolving widespread concerns about Iran in ways short of war. I saw firsthand over the years the ways in which the Gulf's diverse relationships helped advance US interests. Oman, for example, has long served as a quiet mediator between the United States and Iran, including when I served as acting US special envoy for Iran from 2023 to 2025. Oman has continued this role right up to the current crisis. Qatar too maintained channels with Iranian leadership that facilitated negotiations for the release of US hostages in Iran and deconfliction efforts between Washington and Tehran in the region and beyond. Saudi Arabia, while maintaining deep suspicions about the regime in Tehran, had taken tentative steps to rehabilitate its relationship with Iran through a series of high-level meetings following years of effort by the United States, other regional countries, and ultimately China to broker a reconciliation that stabilized the region. And the UAE maintained economic ties with Iran that stretched back decades and served both to tighten sanctions pressure on Tehran and hold out hope of potential economic incentives if the Iranian regime changed its worst behaviors.
But as the war continues, these dynamics that had served the interests of the Gulf states and, in many cases, the United States are shifting, and US policymakers need to be attuned to these changes. This begins with asking the right questions. What the war will ultimately mean for Gulf countries and for US relationships with them turns on answers to a handful of still-open questions. Five of the most pressing of these questions are explored below. The answers could determine how successful the United States is in securing its interests in the region going forward, both in finding an off-ramp for the conflict and in its broader regional objectives. Iran, too, is likely asking many of the same questions as it seeks to exploit opportunities to shape the Gulf to its own ends.
Since it began its retaliation, Iran has targeted GCC oil and gas infrastructure and commercial interests. Its goal has been to pressure Gulf states to lean on the United States and Israel to cease their strikes. In its more recent and consequential strikes on Qatar's Ras Laffan Gas Facility, Tehran has shown that it could potentially expand the scope of its attacks, increasing the economic pain on Gulf states and the global economy. Iran can potentially wield this threat to its advantage, but the approach also carries risks. It is dangerous, for example, to assume that Iran can continue to calibrate its strikes to avoid unintended escalation. Iranian forces might strike Gulf economic interests that, whether intentionally or not, would dramatically widen the war. And even without a dramatic incident, experts and advisers have suggested that global companies and even the Gulf countries themselves are considering what the "new normal" in the region looks like given the lingering impacts and uncertainty from the current conflict and the fact that even a weakened Iran could threaten its neighbors.
There is an immediate concern that the Houthis in Yemen, either for their own interests or at Iran's behest, will enter the conflict. If the group does get involved, then it would likely be by restarting attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait -- threatening the flow of an additional 12 percent of international seaborne oil transits and 8 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. For shipping companies, these attacks would add to the already rising costs from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the higher shipping prices as a result of rerouting still occurring from Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in late 2023. These dangers and the costs associated with them would also affect global markets and, even more immediately and profoundly, Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states given their proximity and the security implications of a re-escalation of the conflict in Yemen.
Aware of the threats the Houthis pose to global shipping and regional security, the US military could continue to carry out new strikes to weaken the group. But regardless of how Houthi actions play out in the coming weeks, Yemen's instability and entrenched domestic conflict will undoubtedly endure, as it has for over a decade, threatening to amplify instability in the Gulf region in unpredictable ways. As Yemen director at the National Security Council during the outbreak of fighting with the Houthis more than a decade ago, I witnessed firsthand how the conflict in Yemen reordered Gulf security and economic priorities -- and over time even led to fissures between GCC member states. Against the backdrop of a worsening conflict with Iran, a second front of fighting in the region might threaten Gulf and US interests in unpredictable ways.
As the conflict drags on, Iran may increasingly try to fracture GCC unity. It could, for example, seek to exploit the differences in interests and perspectives between Gulf countries, each of which has different relationships with Iran, the United States, Israel, and each other. While the GCC does not traditionally have the same rigorous organizing principles as, for example, the European Union, Gulf member states have benefited when they act in unison. To date, there has been a noticeable "rally around the flag" dynamic in the face of Iranian attacks that has papered over differences among Gulf countries. While Iran has engaged with the GCC as a group in prior instances, it has had more success pursuing and maintaining its individual relationships with member states. Iranian leaders likely believe there is value for them in fracturing the group, in the same way that Iran has sought to exploit differences in interests and values between the United States and its other traditional partners and allies.
Memories are both short and long in the region; GCC member states have not forgotten the Gulf rift that occurred during US President Donald Trump's first term. Then years of simmering criticism and concern ignited an escalation of mutual accusations leading Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain to sever relations, close airspace, and enforce a blockade on Qatar for what they said was Doha's funding of terrorism; fomenting regional unrest; ties to Iran. I saw direct implications for US interests as head of political section at US embassy Riyadh at that time.
GCC unity will also likely be a factor in how this conflict ends. At times in recent weeks some Gulf nations have reportedly urged United States to find off-ramp. At other times some have advised escalating strikes to destroy Iranian regime. These conflicting preferences among Gulf countries augur a worrying trend. The ability of GCC to maintain a unified voice—which Iran will actively work to divide—will affect the group's ability to support an end to conflict that advances stability of region as a whole rather than their own parochial interests—as well as its ability to work collectively to advance economic, political, and security goals beyond Iran war.
Since the war began, there has been little news about domestic instability in Gulf countries which aim to continue projecting confidence and stability to wider world. However, longer conflict drags on more that it could affect each nation in various ways. This in turn could lead Gulf states to respond in ways that might be antithetical to US interests and values.
Three points are worth considering here. First, citizens’ economic opportunities and physical security have been—and will continue to be—affected by this conflict. If fighting gets worse it could reach a tipping point where there is greater public outcry to end it. Second, economic duress will affect nations’ residents and migrant labor populations more acutely than their citizens given many Gulf states’ economic systems. If this pressure becomes too much it could lead to wide-ranging and long-lasting human rights issues. Third, in past few decades some Gulf countries have at times viewed minority populations with suspicion accusing certain individuals especially Shia and other minorities of receiving support from Iran. As Iran’s grip on its proxies weakens Tehran might seek to take advantage of any preexisting relationships with these Gulf minority populations. At same time Gulf states might use such rumors and fears to quell domestic unrest with potentially devastating consequences.
In current phase of war Gulf countries will undoubtedly try to reinforce their security through closer partnerships with United States. But depending on outcome of conflict some Gulf countries may develop concerns about US reliability as economic and security partner. Gulf leaders might fault Washington for inability to control conflict or for failing to find off-ramp at appropriate time. If this happens some GCC countries might then choose to reinforce their partnership options beyond United States by strengthening ties with Russia and China—perhaps economically at first but potentially also strategically. This in turn could make it more difficult for United States to pursue its interests in region not only in terms of security goals and Iran policy but also longer-term strategic partnerships on issues as varied as advanced technology artificial intelligence nuclear energy.
Gulf countries have long proven that they maintain their own relationships with Iran and other groups to advance their own interests much in same way that many European countries do. These channels have proven useful to convey messages over years but Trump administration should not underestimate Gulf countries' ability to use same channels to take steps with Iran that might undercut US interests and long-term goals if Washington is unable to find a suitable off-ramp that serves GCC interests. Similarly,Iran might try to take advantage of its relationships with China,Russia,and GCC in ways that run counter to US interests even if current conflict has created suspicion in Iran's relationship with its neighbors.
Mitigating these potential end states will be a long-term project that will require focused attention from Trump administration even after resolution to immediate conflict.
The Trump administration and GCC countries share an interest in finding a resolution to the current conflict that leaves the region more stable than it was before the launch of Operation Epic Fury. But despite the tactical victories of the US and Israeli campaign against Iran, the war appears to have opened the door to a new wave of uncertainty in the Gulf which might threaten regional stability and economic prosperity it is meant to ensure.